On the night of
September 13, 1971, Marshal Lin Biao, Mao Zedong’s handpicked heir and Qinmizhanyou (close
bother-in-arms), fled from China in an airplane. The aircraft, however, crashed
in Mongolia and killed Lin and his family. The Lin Biao Incident dealt Mao a severe blow and
undermined his prestige. It also undermined his physical and mental well-being.
Mao’s health, in fact, never recovered from the blow.The official history of the CCP claims that the Lin Biao
Incident “pushed more cadres and common people to wake up from the fanaticism
of personality cult. It declared in an objective sense the bankruptcy of the
theory and practice of the ‘Cultural Revolution’.” The Project 571, a coup d'état plotted by Marshal Lin’s
son, Lin Liguo, and later made known to the CCP cadres as the proof of Lin
Biao’s crimes, stated that:
In fact he (Mao) has become Qin Shi Huang (China’s first emperor) in the contemporary times…He is not a true Marxist–Leninist. He is the biggest feudal despot in the history of China that practices the Confucianism and implements the laws of Qin Shi Huang.
Nevertheless, Mao
refused to yield or admit that the Cultural Revolution had failed. Rather, as
Mao’s official biography observes, Mao “was extremely concerned about how
people would view the Cultural Revolution in the future.” The biography,
or zhuan, adds
that “on some specific issues Mao could rectify the mistakes that produced
serious consequences, including the adjustment of some important policies. But
he will never permit the criticism and rectification of the guiding thoughts of
the Cultural Revolution…In the next few years the vicissitudes of China’s
political situations were closely connected with these thoughts of Mao.” In June 1976, three months before his death, Mao told his
apparatchiks Hua Guofeng, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Wang Dongxing that:
I have done two things in my life. One is defeating Chiang Kai-shek and driving him to Taiwan, and defeating the Japanese imperialists and driving them out of China; the other is successfully conducting the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
Viewing the Cultural
Revolution as one of the “two things” in his lifelong struggles, Mao spent the
last years of his life trying to safeguard it. He opposed the moderate measures
adopted by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. The major political struggles and
campaigns launched from the Lin Biao Incident to Mao’s death, ranging from the
“Criticize Zhou Enlai” sessions in late 1973, the “Criticize Lin, Criticize
Confucius” movements launched in January 1974 to the “Criticize Deng,
Counterattack the Right-Deviationist Reversal-of-Verdicts Trend” launched in
late 1975, all served this purpose.
At this stage, Mao’s China was increasingly isolated by the so-called “revisionist camp” dominated and influenced by the Soviet Union. The Sino-American rapprochement and the “Three Worlds” theory received bitter criticism from the “revisionist camp.” Pravda, the official Soviet newspaper, in February 1972 accused China of “courting Washington,” “colluding with the American imperialists of obstructing the settlement of important international issues,” “sabotaging the unity between the socialist countries,” and “sacrificing the interests of the Indochinese people.” And the Cuban newspaper reported that “the paper tiger received a warm welcome in Beijing.” The CPUSA (Communist Party of the United States of America) criticized the “Three Worlds” theory as “unscientific.” It accused China of building a “military alliance” with the Pentagon and serving as its “Filth Column” to oppose the Soviet Union.
In addition, cracks had
emerged even in the “revolutionary camp” led by China. The CCP had been
sponsoring the VWP (Vietnamese Workers Party) since the first Indochina War.
But the bilateral relations had cooled since the Soviet Union became involved
in the Vietnam War and began sending substantial aid to North Vietnam in 1965. The relationship
was further undermined by the Sino-American rapprochement. The Sino-American rapprochement also exacerbated the
tensions between the CCP and the other communist parties that followed the CCP
since the Sino-Soviet split. The Party of Labour of Albania had enjoyed a
honeymoon with the CCP and had been an ardent partner in countering Soviet
revisionism. In 1970, its supreme leader Enver Hoxha flattered the Chinese,
saying that “Mao Zedong Thought has become the beacon of Marxism-Leninism,
socialism, and communism in the contemporary world.” Nonetheless, Hoxha
expressed great displeasure with the Sino-American rapprochement and Mao’s
“Three Worlds” theory. In August 1971 Hoxha sent a 10,000–word letter to Mao
Zedong that criticized the CCP for the decision to invite Nixon to Beijing. The letter stated:
We inform you that we deem your decision to host Nixon in Beijing to be incorrect, undesirable. We do not approve it and we do not support it. We believe, moreover, that Nixon's announced visit to China will not be understood and approved by the people, the revolutionaries, and the communists of different countries.
In the political report
delivered to Sixth Congress in November 1971, Hoxha insinuated that China
“relies on one imperialist power to oppose another imperialist power.” Mao seethed with
rage over Hoxha’s accusations even two years later. In July 1973 he told Zhang
Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen that:
The Albanians were determined not to allow the American withdrawal from Vietnam because they believed that “the tempest of world revolution is in Asia. The storm of Asian revolution is in Vietnam. If war ends, it is terrible. That is opportunism—right opportunism.” It was collusion with the U.S. imperialists. The one who purposefully colluded with U.S. imperialists, Japan, Western Germany, and Great Britain is me. What could you do to me?
Mao was fully aware of
the accusations made by the Vietnamese, Albanians, and other “leftist parties”
that his policies were not appropriate for advancing the communist cause. In
April, he complained to his guest, Echeverría, president of Mexico:
Now the situation compelled me to take the “rightist opportunism” path. I invited Nixon here. I also invited Kakuei Tanaka (the Japanese Prime Minister) here. So I get a bad name.
For those communist
parties that had not seized political power in their own countries, many of
them split into two or more factions when the Sino-Soviet split came out into the
open. These new factions further splintered during the Cultural Revolution,
when the CCP called on the “Marx-Leninists” to draw a line separating
themselves from the “revisionists.” For example, one faction supporting the
“anti-revisionism” of the CCP seceded from the French Communist Party and
formed the French Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) in 1967. Another faction
seceded from the French Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) and formed the
French Revolutionary Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) in 1974. With each division, the newly formed parties were
ideologically more radicalized than their mother party
In Chinese, the
parties that followed the ideological guidance of the CCP and upheld Maoism
were called Maliedang (the
Marx-Leninist parties) or Xindang (the
new parties), while those following the CPSU were called Xiuzhengdang (the
revisionist parties) or Jiudang (the
old parties). Since the Sino-Soviet split, approximately one hundred “leftist”
parties and organizations had come into being. However, with the Sino-American rapprochement and the proclamation
of the “Three Worlds” Theory, the CCP was not immune from the criticism of its
followers. A number of Xindang chose
to follow the Party of Labour of Albania and criticized the CCP for its
collusion with the American imperialists. For example, the Communist Party of
Britain (Marist-Leninist), which was established in 1968, praised Hoxha as “the
only communist leader alive” and the Party of Labour of Albania as “the banner
of socialism and Marxism-Leninism.” It criticized the “Three World Theory” for
being “a new version of revisionism” that “counteracted revolutions and
liberation struggles.” Its leader, Reg Birch, visited Beijing in
October-November 1975. In his talk with Geng Biao, Birch made it clear his
disagreement with the “Three Worlds Theory” and advocated that the world should
be classified by “classes.” It was ironic the Chinese would later regard the
Party of Labour of Albania and the communist parties criticizing China for the
rapprochement with the United States and the “Three Worlds Theory” as “the
ultra-leftist parties” just as the CPSU had labelled the CCP.
In addition, for the
communist parties that had been conducting armed struggles against their
governments or the colonial powers by heavily depending on Chinese material
assistance since early 1960s, they remained unable to seize power by the 1970s. Some of them, like the Communist Party of Malaya and
the Communist Party of Burma, were even deeply mired in internal struggles and
purges. In July 1973, in a conversation with Marien Ngouabi, the
president of the Republic of the Congo, Mao indicated his disappointment with
the CCP-aided armed struggles:
We really wanted to overthrow you all because we supported revolutions and revolutionary people [in those years]. But those people (referring to the communist parties or factions supported by China) couldn’t overthrow you and failed to live up to our expectations. We have no other alternative but to deal with you.
If the Chinese were
disappointed with these revolutionaries, they were undoubtedly pleased with
developments in Cambodia. The CCP leaders had long noticed that in comparison
to the VWP, the Khmer Rouge was uncompromising in its opposition to
revisionism. On March 20, 1970, two days after Lon Nol staged the coup to oust
Sihanouk, Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to Mao. He criticized the VWP for its
“pragmatism.” Zhou had more positive things to say about the Khmer Rouge:
Now that Lon Nol and Sirik Matak have come to power, we no longer have the concern (about providing aid to the Khmer Rouge), though. Now Liangyue (the two Vietnams, referring to the VWP and the NLF) are the most disappointing. Everything proceeds from pragmatism. Only the Cambodian Communist Party is resolved to take the path of armed struggle. But their strength is small and experience is little. We need to boost their resolution and build up their confidence. In the end a new prospect will be opened up in the Southeast Asia.
However, the CCP
leaders’ favor for the Khmer Rouge did not immediately translate into all-out
support for their protégé. After the coup, they brokered the united front
between Pol Pot and Sihanouk. In the next three
years, the CCP attempted to maintain the façade of unity. The Chinese strategy
was to provide aid for Pol Pot’s armed struggles while attempting to restore
Sihanouk to power in Phnom Penh through negotiations with the American
policymakers. There were two
reasons behind their considerations. On the one hand, the Khmer Rouge forces
were still very weak. On the other hand,
and more importantly, the CCP leaders did not want Cambodia to develop into
another South Vietnam. They had no intention to embroil China and the United
States in this new battlefield due to their respective support for the Khmer
Rouge and the Lon Nol government. This would lead to the demise of the
Sino-American rapprochement and work only to the advantage of the Soviet Union,
China’s major enemy at this time.
In other words, Mao’s revolutionary zeal was temporarily dampened by concerns for China’s strategic interests. As Zhou told Kissinger in February 1973, “if we wish to see Southeast Asia develop along the lines of peace and neutrality and not enter a Soviet Asian security system, then Cambodia would be an exemplar country.” Zhou continued: “it is impossible for Cambodia to become completely red now. If that were attempted, it would result in even greater problems.” But China’s stance abruptly swerved a few months later. In late May 1973 Kissinger made a proposal to the Chinese of restoring Sihanouk to power in Phnom Penh. This was exactly what the CCP leaders had desired. Sino-American cooperation would stabilize the Cambodian situation and preclude the Soviet influence. On June 4, Huang Hua, chief of the Chinese Liaison Office, replied to Kissinger that China would “communicate the U.S. tentative thinking to the Cambodian side.” However, on July 18, the American side was told that “China was no longer willing even to communicate the American negotiating proposal to Sihanouk.”
What was the cause of
China’s sudden change in policy? In his memoirs, Kissinger claims that it was
because of the bombing halt legislated by the US congress in June 1973.
“Congress gave away the American side of the bargain unilaterally” and as a
result, “Zhou lost the ability to shape events.” In comparison,
Zhai Qiang’s explanation of why China became more eager to support Pol Pot than
Sihanouk between late 1973 and early 1974 is that the increasing skirmishes
between the Khmer Rouge and the VWP assuaged the Chinese policymakers’ fear
that a Khmer Rouge–controlled Cambodia would align with Hanoi in the future. To be sure, the US
bombing halt and decrease in aid to the Lon Nol government reduced the CCP
leaders’ fears that the two countries would be locked in the entanglements over
Cambodia which would derail cooperation against the Soviet Union. The Khmer
Rouge’s clashes with the VWP meant that it would lean toward China—however, it
should be noted that the CCP leaders noticed the differences between these two
parties much earlier than Zhai notes.
The most important reason for the change in China’s policy was Mao’s desire to safeguard the Cultural Revolution and reconsolidate his reputation and authority. Mao’s concern for China’s geopolitical interests gave way to his rekindled revolutionary zeal. The real cause of China’s sudden turn of policy on Cambodia in June-July 1973 was Mao’s dissatisfaction with Zhou Enlai’s efforts to rectify the leftist policies and he was alert to Zhou’s rise of power after the Lin Biao Incident. In addition, Mao was frustrated with the setbacks of his strategy of “alliance with the U.S. to deter the Soviet Union.”
Mao’s solution was to censure Zhou, China’s principal negotiator in the Sino-American talks, and harden China’s stance towards the United States. The opportunity came in June 1973. Mao criticized Zhou for being soft in the negotiations with the Americans. On June 24, Mao remarked on Zhou’s report of a talk with David Bruce, chief of the American Liaison Office, that “[the MFA] often forgets struggles in the cooperation with the bourgeoisie [referring to the Americans]. Following Mao’s instruction, the next day Zhou took a tougher stance in the talks with Bruce. Furthermore, in early July, Zhou was forced to do self-criticism because Mao was irritated by the MFA’s analysis of the Soviet-American talks. As a result, Kissinger’s proposal on Cambodia was brushed aside. Nonetheless, whether the CCP leaders were able to pressurize their Khmer Rouge comrades into complying with this proposal is questionable. Even if they had succeeded, they would have surely antagonized the Khmer Rouge and been accused of “betrayal,” just as the Vietnamese leaders charged China with “betrayal” at the General Conference in 1954 and during Sino–American rapprochement.
In November 1974, Kissinger, in his talk with the rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping, once again proposed a settlement to remove Lon Nol, restore Sihanouk to real power in Phnom Penh over a coalition government, and let Sihanouk “emerge as the dominant force.” It was almost the same proposal as made in 1973. Kissinger made it clear that “if Sihanouk comes back as the head of the insurgent forces [referring to the Khmer Rouge forces], he will not last long. He will just be a figurehead.” In response Deng disagreed with US involvement and said “let them solve their problem.” Deng’s words indicated clearly that the CCP leaders now preferred a “red Cambodia” dominated by the Khmer Rouge, rather than the old regime under Sihanouk. By the end of 1974 the Khmer Rouge’s victory was clearly in sight. Having much less reason to endorse the US proposal, the Chinese leaders rejected it more resolutely than they did during the previous year. Ironically, after the Khmer Rouge’s collapse in January 1979, it would be Deng Xiaoping’s turn to urge the Americans and Sihanouk not to “exclude Pol Pot and his forces” in the new coalition against Vietnam.
The
Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh and succeeded in seizing power in April 1975.
For the CCP leaders, the Khmer Rouge victory was truly purchased at a cheap
price. The amount of Chinese assistance to the Khmer Rouge before 1975 was
minimal compared to that furnished to the VWP. From 1970 to 1974, Chinese
assistance rendered to the Khmer Rouge was valued at 316 million yuan. In the same period, the value of Chinese assistance to
North Vietnam was 5,041 million yuan. From 1971 to 1975, the assistance to North Vietnam alone
constituted 93.1-percent of the assistance to the three Indochina countries
(North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). Considering that the CCP had been aiding the VWP since
1950, but its assistance to the Khmer Rouge started only from August 1970, it
was ironic that by April 1975, when the Vietnam War finally ended, the CCP’s
massive investment in the VWP produced a troublesome ally that was more closely
aligned with its principal enemy, the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the
relatively small assistance that China offered to the Khmer Rouge produced a
close ally in Cambodia.
Thus the Khmer Rouge’s
victory on April 17, 1975, came at a time when Mao’s Cultural Revolution was
bankrupt at home, the CCP-backed revolutionary struggles receded abroad, and
the conflicts between the CCP and the VWP, the Party of Labour of Albania, and
other “Marx-Leninist parties” had emerged. Mao and the CCP were thirsty for new
momentum and stimulation more than ever, while the Khmer Rouge’s seizure of
power and the following revolutions in Cambodia exactly provided the boost.
These developments shed light on Mao’s favorable view of the Khmer Rouge. On
June 21, 1975 Mao had a talk with Pol Pot in Beijing. Mao said,
We agree with you! Much
of your experience is better than ours. China is not qualified to criticize
you. We committed errors of the political routes for ten times in fifty
years—some are national, some are local…Thus I say China has no qualification
to criticize you but have to applaud you. You are basically correct…
… In fifty years, or one
hundred years, or even ten thousand years there will be the struggles of the
two lines. There will be the struggles of two lines when communism arrives. If
not, they are not Marxists.
In his talk, Mao said
that China was still struggling between the “two lines.” He praised the leaders
of the Khmer Rouge for their victory and also stressed the importance of class
struggle. The CCP and the Khmer Rouge shared the same mission of continuing the
revolution and preventing the restoration of capitalism in their own countries.
The discredited Mao, under increasing suspicion and criticism in and outside
China, rejoiced over the Khmer Rouge’s fresh victory in Cambodia. This laid the
foundation for the establishment of friendly and supportive Sino-Cambodian
relations in late 1970s.
The symbolic meaning of
the Khmer Rouge’s victory and revolutions was significant for Mao’s China. The
Khmer Rouge revolutions showed not only to the Chinese people, but also to
people throughout the world, that Mao’s revolutionary path, which combined
armed struggle, anti-revisionism, and continuous revolution, was tenable. Thus
by supporting the Khmer Rouge and its revolutions, Mao could demonstrate that
China was still revolutionary. In contrast to Andrew Mertha’s argument, the
analysis here shows that Mao’s China, while receiving “little tangible
benefits,” nevertheless reaped intangible and symbolic benefits from the Khmer
Rouge’s policies and successes. In Mao’s mind, these intangible benefits were more
significant than anything tangible.
It was true that in 1975
Mao and Deng had urged the Khmer Rouge leaders to bring Sihanouk home. But they clearly knew that Sihanouk would stay a
figurehead in the transitional period. With his power base already wiped out,
Sihanouk posed no threat to the Pol Pot regime in the new Cambodia, just as
many democratic figureheads assumed high but powerless positions in the CCP
regime after 1949. The CCP leaders stood by when Sihanouk announced his
retirement from the office of “head of state” in April 1976. In Mao’s mind, the
Khmer Rouge leaders were authentic revolutionary comrades while Sihanouk, after
all, was just an old friend and an outdated dynastic ruler. Most importantly, a China struggling in the “continuous
revolutions” was not in the position to criticize or moderate a Cambodia on the
threshold of launching new revolutions.
